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DO DAMAGES CAPS REDUCE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE PREMIUMS?: A 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF ESTIMATES AND THE METHODS USED TO PRODUCE THEM 
 
Kathryn Zeiler
∗
 and Lorian Hardcastle‡  
 
Abstract 
Despite common claims made in policy debates, the theoretical connection between tort reform 
and medical malpractice insurance premiums is ambiguous. Simple models suggest reforms such 
as statutory damages caps reduce premiums. More elaborate models that account for changes in 
physician behavior suggest caps might increase or have no impact on premiums. A number of 
empirical studies have been conducted to estimate the impacts of caps on premiums, and several 
qualitative literature reviews have attempted to draw general conclusions from the literature. No 
review, however, has offered a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the full set of empirical 
studies. This Chapter fills that gap. We provide a first glimpse at the wide methodological 
variations in the studies that employ regression analysis to estimate the impacts of caps on 
medical malpractice insurance premiums. We describe 16 empirical studies that report 197 
estimates of the impact of caps on premiums. Using a theory-driven framework to develop a set 
of best practices, we find that little weight can be put on any one study due to broad 
methodological shortcomings. This Chapter highlights the need for better data and additional 
research on the impact of caps on premiums.  
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1. Introduction 
The medical malpractice liability system is designed to compensate victims of medical 
malpractice both for economic damages and non-economic damages, such as pain, suffering and 
loss of consortium. A second major function of the system is to provide incentives for health care 
professionals to provide reasonable care.1 By internalizing the cost of injuries to physicians, the 
hope is that the threat of malpractice liability will encourage physicians to provide care that will 
reduce the likelihood of iatrogenic injuries. 
Most providers purchase malpractice insurance to protect themselves against the risk of 
claims. Over the last several decades, insurance prices have fluctuated wildly, and the liability 
system, and large damage awards in particular, is most often pointed to as the culprit. The U.S. 
has faced three distinct medical malpractice insurance crises since the mid-1970s. These crises 
are characterized by sharp increases in premiums followed by market exit by some insurers, 
which reduces supply, putting additional upward pressure on prices.  
Each crisis has triggered a call for major reform of the tort system. U.S. states began 
implementing tort reforms during the mid-1970s, with subsequent waves of reforms in the mid-
1980s and early-2000s (Mello, 2006; Nelson et al., 2007). One of the most popular reforms, caps 
on damages available at trial, has taken center stage.2 Congress continues to consider whether to 
implement a federal cap on non-economic damages, which all states would be required to impose 
on jury verdicts in medical malpractice cases (Hyman and Sage, 2011; House bill H.R. 5 (March 
22, 2012)).  
                                                 
1 The general standard of care is that which a reasonable physician in the same class as the treating physician would 
have provided. Class is determined by factors such as knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education. See e.g., 
Sheeley v. Memorial Hospital, 710 A.2d. 161 (1998).  
2 By Ronen Avraham’s (2011) latest count, nine states impose some sort of cap on total medical malpractice 
damages, 26 on non-economic damages and 31 on punitive damages. 
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The question of whether caps reduce premiums is important. Evidence suggests that caps 
come with costs, such as disproportionate effects on economically disadvantaged groups and 
vulnerable segments of the population (e.g., Rubin and Shepherd, 2008). So if the benefits 
legislators promise in the form of lower premiums—and adequate physician supply3 and lower 
health care costs4—are not realized, caps result in a net loss. While legislators also argue that 
caps will reduce defensive medicine, recent studies indicate that doctors engage in much less 
defensive medicine than is commonly argued.5 If legislatures are left to hang their hats only on 
premium reductions as the primary benefit of caps, understanding the relationship between caps 
and premiums is critical. 
While simple theoretical models predict that caps will lower payouts and thus lower 
premiums, more nuanced models suggest that the story might not be so simple. Models that 
account for the potential impact of caps on provider treatment choices and their decisions over 
how much effort to expend to develop and maintain medical expertise predict that caps will 
increase injury rates, at least under some conditions. In turn, this may cause an increase in claim 
rates, total payouts by medical malpractice insurers, and malpractice insurance prices.  
These theories have been put to the test in a number of empirical studies. Since the early 
1980s, researchers have generated empirical research studies investigating the impacts of caps on 
                                                 
3 See e.g., Yang et al. (2008), which summarizes the empirical literature and provides evidence that caps do not 
seem to impact obstetrician/gynecologists’ location decisions. 
4 Little is currently known about the impact of caps on health care costs. See Avraham and Schanzenbach (2010) for 
a review of the scant literature and evidence that caps reduce private health care insurance premiums by a modest 
amount. 
5 Proponents of caps commonly claim that consumers benefit from the impact caps have on defensive medicine. 
Specifically, the claim is that caps reduce the number of unnecessary medical procedures physician prescribe solely 
to protect themselves from medical malpractice liability. Recent evidence, however, suggests that defensive 
medicine accounts for a relatively small portion of total health care costs. See e.g., Sloan and Shadle (2009), 
Thomas, et al. (2010). Mello et al. (2010) use a back-of-the-envelope method to estimate that defensive medicine 
comprised 2.4% of health care spending in 2008. 
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premiums. While the general consensus seems to be that caps slow the growth of premiums,6 a 
closer and more comprehensive look at the empirical literature reveals mixed results at best. A 
deeper look also reveals wide variation in the methods used to produce the results. 
The aim of this study is two-fold. First, we examine how strongly the literature as a 
whole supports the claim that caps slow the growth of premiums. Using a basic “vote count” 
method, we find that only 61 (31%) of the 197 estimates reported in 16 studies suggest that caps 
reduce premiums (at the 10% significance level using one-tailed tests). While this result might 
seem to contradict the general conclusion that caps reduce premiums, the usefulness of reported 
results depends strongly on the methods employed to produce them. 
Our second aim, therefore, is to gauge the level of confidence we can place on reported 
results. We do this by taking a detailed look at the methods used to produce results not only at 
the study level but also at the estimate level. While other literature reviews count studies as 
either supporting the caps-reduce-premiums claim or rejecting it (Mello 2010; RAND 2011), 14 
of the 16 studies report numerous estimates computed using different methods. In each of the 14 
studies, the results are mixed. By assessing results at the estimate level, we provide the most 
nuanced set of conclusions that confidentially can be drawn from the existing empirical 
literature. 
The conclusions are not heartening. After assessing the studies along several 
dimensions—generalizability of results given data employed, attention to possible model 
assumption violations, additional sources of measurement error and controls for omitted variable 
bias—we find that no one study employs a consistently solid set of empirical methods. In fact, 
most studies come with a number of serious limitations. The bottom-line conclusion is that the 
                                                 
6 “The most recent controlled studies show that caps moderately constrain the growth of premiums.” Mello (2006) 
Note that Mello also summarizes studies that do not support this claim. 
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literature is in need of better data and more methodologically sound analysis based on 
comprehensive theoretical models of how various factors, including damages caps, impact 
premiums.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Part 2 describes the existing literature, both 
theoretical and empirical. Part 3 provides a systematic review of the empirical literature at the 
estimate level. After summarizing the estimation methods used and their purposes, we assess the 
validity of the reported results. We find that little weight can be placed on any estimate reported 
in the literature given deficiencies in estimation techniques. We describe flaws common to every 
study and discuss the need for a better dataset to measure malpractice insurance premiums. Part 4 
concludes and offers a roadmap for future research. 
2. Existing Literature 
A. The Theoretical Relationship Between Caps and Premiums 
Theoretical accounts of the impacts of statutory damages caps on medical malpractice 
insurance premiums have produced varying predictions. The most basic analyses predict that 
damages caps will reduce recoveries and claim rates, reduce the time it takes to settle claims and 
reduce overall litigation expenses (Rubin, 1993; CBO, 2011). Some predict that tort reforms will 
create a more stable liability environment with less underwriting uncertainty (Born and Viscusi, 
1998; Barker, 1992).7 These effects, it is argued, will lead to a reduction in medical malpractice 
insurance premiums.  
Alternative accounts of the impacts of caps on premiums consider second-order effects 
and whether caps would, in fact, bind recoveries. For example, Hyman et al. (2007) use data on 
                                                 
7 Note that these studies acknowledge that the causality may be reversed—instead of reforms improving insurer 
profitability, insurer behavior may determine a states’ willingness to enact reforms. The mechanisms through which 
tort reforms influence premiums are important to understand so that empirical models can account for the 
complexities. 
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Texas closed medical malpractice claims to explore why amounts plaintiffs collect are so often 
well below the amounts juries award. Their results suggest that the discrepancy is due in part to 
the fact that plaintiffs rarely collect the portion of damage awards that exceeds the defendant 
physicians’ per occurrence policy limit. The authors argue that limits on collectability of 
amounts of the policy limit can “substantially mute the real-world impact of statutory caps” 
(Hyman et al., 2007, p. 53). Others have suggested that plaintiffs’ attorneys react to damages 
caps by arguing more vigorously for damages that are not capped, often economic damages such 
as lost wages, and that juries simply substitute higher damages of the uncapped varieties for 
capped damages (Sharkey, 2005).   
Others have considered the impacts of caps on incentives for providers to engage in 
costly activities that reduce the likelihood of patient injuries. Zeiler (2003) argues that although 
caps might reduce average payouts, they also might increase the number of claims, thereby 
failing to reduce overall costs of covering physician liability. As caps reduce exposure to 
liability, the argument goes, the benefits physicians (and the managed care organizations that 
influence their treatment choices) enjoy from providing expensive treatments are diminished. At 
the margin, this theory predicts that caps lead to more iaogenic injuries. Similarly, Arlen and 
MacLeod (2005) predict that caps will reduce physician investment in costly efforts to maintain 
and develop expertise. Thus, total medical malpractice insurer losses will depend on the 
influence of caps on claim rates relative to average claim payouts. While total losses might 
decrease, these theories predict that, under some conditions, they will remain stable or increase.8 
B. Empirical Tests of the Predicted Impacts of Caps on Premiums 
The temporal and geographic variation in tort reform implementation has allowed 
researchers to compare premiums pre-cap and post-cap in states that implemented caps and to 
                                                 
8 Rubin and Shepherd (2008) find that caps increase female death rates. 
 7 
compare states with caps to those without caps. Researchers have employed the information to 
estimate the impact of reforms, including damages caps, on malpractice insurance premiums. As 
this evidence accumulated, researchers began to produce literature reviews, drawing general 
conclusions from the numerous studies. Our search9 revealed seven relevant reviews: OTA, 
1993; CBO, 2004; Kessler, 2006; Kane and Emmons, 2005 and 2007 (discussed as a single 
study); Nelson et al., 2007; Studdert and Mello, 2004, Mello, 2006, Mello and Kachalia, 2010, 
and Kachalia and Mello, 2011 (discussed as a single study10); and RAND, 2011.11  
Appendix 1 summarizes the scope of each literature review. The reviews include 
different sets of primary studies, although none covers all 16 studies included in our analysis. 
Some describe the method used to include particular studies and exclude others, most of which 
involve an evaluation of the strength of the empirical methods the primary study authors used 
and whether and by whom the study was published. Most reviews draw general conclusions 
about the impacts of several tort reforms, while some focus on the impacts of caps. Some 
reviews go beyond our variable of interest—premiums—to consider the impacts of tort reform 
on payment size, claim rates, defensive medicine, physician supply, quality of care, defense 
costs, and health expenditures. We focus solely on the association between caps and premiums, 
the question most widely studied and of central interest in current political debates. 
                                                 
9 Our goal was to identify all literature reviews drawing general conclusions about the impacts of damages caps on 
premiums from studies that employed regression analyses. We searched several databases (PubMed, EconLit, 
SSRN, ProQuest Theses and Dissertations, Catalog of U.S. Government Publications, Academic Search Primer, 
Google Scholar, ABI/Inform Global, Goggle Books, Westlaw and Index to Legal Periodicals) generally using the 
following search term: (“tort reform” OR “damage cap” OR “damage caps” OR “damages caps”) AND (“literature 
review” OR “systematic review”). Because literature reviews (particularly government reports) tend not to self-
identify as “literature reviews,” we searched for papers citing the primary tort reform studies. Finally, we searched 
the bibliographies of the literature reviews to find references to other reviews.  
10 Studdert and Mello, 2004 is a shorter, less detailed version of Mello, 2006. Mello and Kachalia, 2010 includes 
more recent information. Kachalia and Mello, 2011 is a shorter version of the 2010 paper, with little additional 
information. 
11 This literature review used Mello’s 2006 methodology but addressed more recent cap studies. There is significant 
overlap between the RAND review and Mello’s 2010 update of her 2006 paper. 
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The two most recent and comprehensive reviews to date conclude that damages caps 
likely reduce premiums. The first by Mello and co-authors (2006 and 2010) is the most 
sophisticated review. The 2010 version includes eight primary studies. The authors set out the 
following criteria for assessing the rigorousness of a study: a sufficiently comprehensive data 
source, low potential for error or bias, appropriateness of methodology, adequacy of controls for 
confounding variables, adequacy of sample size, and appropriateness of interpretation and 
conclusions. The authors conclude that more recent data suggest that caps reduce premiums by 
6-13%, although the authors cite numerous studies that report no effect on premiums.  
The second recent review by RAND (2010) piggybacks off the work of Mello and her co-
authors. This brief review updates Mello’s 2006 findings, employs a similar methodology for 
study inclusion, and corroborates Mello’s conclusions. Summarizing her earlier findings, the 
RAND review concluded that four studies (two of which were methodologically strong) showed 
a link between caps and reduced premiums and four studies (one strong) did not. 
While both reviews are helpful in demonstrating the variation in reported results, they 
come with an important limitation. Specifically, both reviews classify studies “as having 
significant findings if any specification of a damages cap variable was statistically significant.” 
(Mello, 2006, p. 10) In doing so, they brush aside ubiquitous within-study variation in results.12 
None of the primary studies included in the Mello et al. and RAND reviews reported consistent 
results; at least half of each study’s results failed to support the claim that caps reduce 
premiums.13  
                                                 
12 Mello’s review lists Zuckerman et al (1990), Danzon et al. (2004), Thorpe (2004) and Viscusi & Born (2005) as 
support for the claim that caps reduce premiums even though 3 of 6, 4 of 6, 4 of 6 and 9 of 12 results, respectively, 
failed to support the claim at the 10% significance level (see Table 1 below). Despite these mixed results, Mello 
concludes (from Danzon et al, Thorpe and Viscusi et al.) that “studies based on data from the 1990s and the early 
years of the current malpractice crisis consistently found that caps had a modest but statistically significant 
constraining effect on premiums during this period…” (p. 12; emphasis added) 
13 Section 3, infra, details the individual results reported by each study. 
 9 
 Our goal is two-fold. First, we aim to present a more comprehensive and detailed 
summary of results from primary research studies, taking into account the widespread within-
study variation. Second, we attempt a more nuanced evaluation of the methodological soundness 
of studies based on the use of theory-driven best methods.  
3. Systematic Literature Review 
A. Overview of Primary Study Results 
Our first step involved collecting all relevant empirical studies. As described in Appendix 
3, we tailored our search terms to particular research databases. We reviewed each relevant result 
for additional studies our searches had not captured and for mentions of unreported regressions 
(e.g., robustness checks). We were unable to obtain results from unreported regressions.14 Our 
analysis includes all of the studies from the literature reviews and additional studies not included 
in any reviews (in bold type in Table 1). We identified 16 studies reporting 197 estimates of the 
impact of caps on premiums.  
We begin with the most basic inquiry: considering all available evidence from regression 
analyses that estimate the association between caps and premiums, how strongly does the 
evidence support the common claim that caps reduce premiums? Summary statistics computed 
using the entire set of results suggest a closer look is warranted. Only 61 (31%) of the 197 
reported results support the claim that caps are associated with a statistically significant decrease 
in premiums (10% significance level for one-tailed test). Forty-nine of the 197 results (25%) 
support the claim at the 5% significance level. 
                                                 
14 Sloan, 1985; Danzon et al., 2004; Viscusi and Born, 1995; Viscusi and Born, 2005: no longer have records. 
Barker, 1992: would take considerable time to review methodology and find unreported regression records. Crain et 
al., 2009: no access to records. Grace and Leverty, 2011: paper in progress so other results not yet available. 
Zuckerman et al., 1990; Thorpe, 2004: no response. 
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Researchers have used three different proxies for premiums. Some studies use premiums 
paid by physicians of certain specialties for policies with identical policy limits and duration. For 
example, Sloan (1985) uses survey data on premiums paid by general practitioners, 
ophthalmologists, and orthopedic surgeons for policies with limits of $100,000 per occurrence 
and $300,000 over the coverage period (“$100,000/$300,000 policies”). Bhat (2001) uses 
premiums charged by a single multi-state medical malpractice insurer for physicians of the same 
risk class and for $1M/$3M policies. Others use aggregate premiums written (Blackmon et al., 
1991; Viscusi et al. 1993) or aggregate premiums earned (Viscusi and Born, 1995; Born and 
Viscusi 1998) as a proxy for price.15 Finally, several authors employ loss ratios—the ratio of 
losses incurred by an insurer to total premiums earned by that insurer—as a proxy for price. The 
inverse of this ratio represents the effective price of insurance: the amount physicians pay for 
each dollar the insurer indemnifies.16 Thus, if caps are correlated with increased loss ratios, we 
can conclude that caps reduce the effective price of insurance.  
Similarly, primary study authors have studied a variety of damages caps. Some study the 
impact of caps on non-economic compensatory damages (e.g., pain and suffering). Others study 
the impacts of punitive damages caps, while others investigate the impact of caps on total 
damages, or they group together caps of various sorts.17 Some have posited different impacts for 
different types of caps (e.g., Sharkey (2005) argues that punitive damages will have a smaller 
                                                 
15 “Premiums written” is the total premiums generated from all policies written by an insurer within a given period 
of time (cash basis of accounting for premiums). “Premiums earned” is the portion of the total premium amount 
corresponding to the coverage provided during a given time period (accrual basis of accounting for premiums). 
16 The loss ratio “can be used as a measure of the relative price of insurance because it reflects the proportion of 
premium dollars that are returned in the form of loss payments to those insured.” (Barker, 1992, p. 145); “[O]ne can 
view the loss ratio as a measure of the inverse of the ex post unit price of insurance.” (Viscusi and Born, 2005, p. 38)  
17 This group includes cap of any sort, cap on total damages or immunities from liability, caps on the total amount 
physicians pay but not the amount patients received, caps on economic and non-economic damages, caps on 
economic and/or non-economic damages, and caps on economic or non-economic damages. 
 11 
impact on premiums relative to non-economic and economic caps because punitive damages are 
rarely awarded in medical malpractice cases). 
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the result counts by premium proxy type. It also lists the 
publication type of each study and the years covered by the premiums data and the caps data. 
The breakdown reveals a substantial difference in the pattern of results depending on the proxy 
used for premiums. When premiums per physician or aggregate premiums are employed, 55-
57% of the results are not significant at the 10% level, 7-10% of results are significant at the 
10% level (but not the 5% level) and 34-35% are significant at the 5% level. When researchers 
use loss ratios as a proxy for premiums, none of the results supports the claim that caps reduce 
premiums at the 10% level.
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Table 1: Features of primary studies 
Study 
(first author) 
Publication 
type 
Premiums 
period Caps period 
# of 
esti-
mates 
Premium Paid/Doc Aggregate Premiums Loss Ratio 
Not s.s. 5-10% 5% Not s.s. 5-10% 5% Not s.s. 
5-
10% 5% 
Sloan 85 PRJ 1974-1978 1974-1978 14 13  1       
Zuckerman 90 PRJ 1974-1986 1974-1986 6 3  3       
Blackmon 91 book chapter 1985, 1988 1986 4    2  2    
Barker 92 PRJ 1977-1986 1975 4       4   
Viscusi 93 PRJ 1988 1985-1987 6    3   3   
Viscusi 95 PRJ 1985-1991 1985-1987 6    3   3   
Born 98 Brookings Inst. 1985-1991 1985-1987 42    6 3 12 21   
Guis 98 PRJ 1976-1990 1976-1990 1    1      
Bhat 01 book 1990-1994 1990-1994 4 2  2       
Zeiler 03 dissertation 1991-2001 1991-2001 4 1 1 2       
Danzon 04 Brookings Inst. 1994-2003 1994-2003 6 4  2       
Thorpe 04 PRJ 1985-2001 1985-2001 6 1  1 1  1 2   
Viscusi 05 PRJ 1984-1991 1984-1991 12    3 1 2 6   
Kilgore 06 PRJ 1991-2004 1991-2004 45 23 5 17       
Crain 09 PR Inst 2004, 2006 2004, 2006 1   1       
Grace 11 unpublished 1985-2005 1985-2005 36    13 2 3 18   
Total    197 47 (57%) 
6 
(7%) 
29 
(35%) 
32 
(55%) 
6 
(10%) 
20 
(34%) 
57 
(100%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
 
Notes: PRJ = peer-reviewed journal; PR Inst = Pacific Research Institute; Not s.s. = not statistically significant at the 10% level (one-tailed test); 5-
10% = significant at the 10% level, but not at 5%; 5% = significant at the 5% level. Bolded studies were not included in any prior literature review. 
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The average p-value produced by 194 one-tailed tests of significance is 0.47 (standard 
deviation = 0.40).18 Figure 1 displays the distribution of observed or estimated one-tailed p-
values for results produced using different proxies for premiums.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of one-tailed p-values by premium proxy 
Premium Paid per Physician         Aggregate Premiums 
              
Loss Ratios 
 
 
The Figure demonstrates that conclusions drawn from the empirical literature depend greatly 
on the proxy. Although the majority of results produced using per-physician premiums and 
                                                 
18 Thorpe (2004) did not provide sufficient information to estimate p-values related to three of the six results he 
reported.  
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aggregate premiums are statistically insignificant at the 10% level, these proxies are much more 
likely to produce statistically significant results than loss ratios. The results produced using loss 
ratios support the claim that insurers collect more in premiums per indemnified dollar after caps 
are implemented.  
As Mello et al. (2006, 2010) point out, vote counts can be misleading if some of the 
studies producing results are not methodologically sound. In the following section we describe 
the methods commonly used by primary study authors to obtain valid results. That section is 
followed by a discussion of what we can infer from the literature given the methods employed. 
B. Estimation Methods 
Had policy makers implemented caps randomly over states and years while holding all 
else constant, estimating the impact of caps on premiums merely would entail comparing the 
difference in premiums before and after the implementation of caps in the treatment states 
relative to differences in the control states over the same time period. Estimation is not so simple 
given that states did not implement caps randomly from year to year and all else was not held 
constant. Therefore, the validity of results depends on the use of methods to control for 
measurement error and whether the necessary assumptions of the chosen empirical model are 
satisfied. In addition, the data employed will impact generalizability of reported results. This 
subsection describes methods necessary to produce valid and generalizable results.19  
1. Model and Sample Selection 
 The most preliminary choices researchers make involve selection of the empirical model, 
the sample size, the level of observation (e.g., state or insurance company), and the time period 
covered by the data. 
                                                 
19 Note that this section is not intended to be a comprehensive list of such necessary methods. The discussion is 
tailored to the methods employed in the 16 original studies. Our goal is to provide a sense of some of the common 
methods for properly modeling the impacts of policy changes on outcomes. 
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 Every original study uses one of three basic model types: ordinary least squares (OLS), 
weighted least squares (WLS) and quantile regression (QR). OLS models estimate linear 
relationships by minimizing the sum of squared errors (e.g., differences between observed 
premiums and values predicted by the linear approximation). WLS models employ OLS 
techniques but weight the observations to take into account the possibility that not all 
observations are equal (e.g., Barker (1992) assumes the variance of error decreases 
proportionally as risk exposure increases and, thus, weights observations by a function of the 
premium volume by state). QR models are used to account for the possibility that caps 
differentially impact firms (e.g., firms of various sizes or profitability levels (Born et al., 1998)) 
and that outliers might impact estimates. 
Studies also vary with respect to the level of observation. Some researchers use panel 
data with observations at the state-year level (Gius, 2004); others use panels with observations at 
the insurer-state-year level (Zuckerman, 1990; Kilgore, 2006); and some employ cross-sectional 
datasets, with all states observed in a single year (Viscusi and Born, 2005).20 Panel datasets are 
known to produce more precise estimates, partly because they come with larger sample sizes, 
which allow for higher degrees of freedom.21 Generally, the power of the statistical test 
increases as the number of degrees of freedom increases. The higher the power, the higher the 
likelihood of detecting an effect if one exists. 
Along the same lines, the number of years covered by the data will impact the precision 
of the results. The primary studies cover a range of time periods for which caps are coded and for 
which insurance outcomes are recorded. For example, Viscusi and Born (1995) and Born et al. 
(1998) considered whether variation in caps enacted during the years 1985-1987 explains any of 
                                                 
20 All studies that cover multiple years adjust premiums for inflation. 
21 The number of degrees of freedom is equal to the sample size minus the number of independent variables included 
in the regression equation minus 1 (for the constant term). 
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the variation in premiums across insurers for the years 1985-1991. Guis (1998) used a panel 
dataset, which included variation in both caps and premiums for the years 1976-1990. Earlier 
studies typically consider a substantially smaller range of years (e.g., Zuckerman (1990) argued 
that Sloan’s (1985) results might be impacted by the fact that his data cover only four years). 
2. Generalizability 
The extent to which we can generalize from reported results depends on the 
characteristics of the data employed and whether those characteristics generalize to the 
population about which claims are made. All 16 original studies draw general conclusions about 
the impact of damages caps on insurance premiums. Given the nature of the data, however, such 
claims might be too broad in some cases. 
First, reported results vary over the time periods studied. This variation might be due to 
changes over time in impacts caps have on prices. For example, caps that are not inflation-
adjusted might become more binding over time, leading to a decrease in prices). Alternatively, it 
might result from unobservable changes to markets or the liability system that are unrelated to 
but correlated with caps. For example, changes in the average medical malpractice policy size 
purchased, which is typically unobservable (i.e., the data are difficult to obtain), might impact 
premiums.22 If unobservable features change over time, putting the greatest weight on recent 
studies might be most prudent (assuming the current environment is most similar to the 
environment during the most recently studied years) (Mello, 2006).  
Second, and more importantly, the data employed to measure premiums should allow 
us to draw general conclusions from the results. To start, the data should act as a good proxy for 
premiums. If we have reason to believe that caps impact premiums differently than the variable 
                                                 
22 Zeiler et al. (2007) report that Texas physicians that have made payments to claimants have purchased policies 
with lower policy limits over time. 
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used as a proxy, generalizing from the proxy to premiums is problematic. Alternatively, the 
proxy might be a good one but might represent a small slice of the population of interest. Again, 
if we have reason to believe that caps might impact premiums of different types of policies 
differently, then we should be careful about generalizing from a subset of policy types to all 
policy types. The data used in the 16 original studies come from a variety of sources, cover a 
variety of provider types and include a variety of coverages (i.e., policy limits), which are 
sometimes controlled in the analysis. In some cases inferences about the impacts of caps on 
premiums are restricted to policies with a certain level of coverage (e.g., $100,000 per 
occurrence and $300,000 annual aggregate). In other cases, policy limits are controlled so that 
variation in premiums related to variation in coverage is separated from premiums variation 
caused by variation in caps. In the latter case, the estimated impact of caps on premiums is 
interpreted as the average impact across all policy types. 
Finally, some studies estimating the impacts of caps on non-economic damages identify 
separately the impacts of caps of different types. Some studies consider the impacts of caps of 
different sizes (e.g., non-economic caps cannot exceed $250,000). Others consider the impacts of 
permanent caps separately from the impacts of temporary caps, which eventually are overturned 
or repealed (Grace and Leverty, 2011). 
3. Model assumption violations23 
 
The primary studies employ a wide variety of empirical modeling techniques. As 
mentioned, OLS is the most commonly employed regression model. This model requires several 
assumptions to be satisfied. The most widely violated assumptions include non-normal 
distribution of error terms, heteroskedastic error terms, serial correlation of error terms, and 
                                                 
23 The technical details included in this section are explained in basic econometrics textbooks. E.g., see Wooldridge 
(2008) and Greene (2002). 
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simultaneity.24 For our purposes, the technical details of these assumption violations are 
unimportant. We focus instead on whether primary study authors properly attended to them. 
Non-normal distribution of error terms. The basic linear regression model assumes that 
error terms are normally distributed. A non-normally distributed dependent variable can result in 
non-normally distributed error terms. When a dependent variable takes on only positive values 
(e.g., premiums), a common approach used to nudge the error terms towards a normal 
distribution is to log-transform the dependent variable. While this transformation might result in 
error terms that satisfy the normality assumption, it is not a guaranteed fix. Alternative 
transformations might solve the problem.  
Heteroskedastic error terms. If errors term variances are not constant across different 
values of the independent variables, our confidence in hypothesis test results is compromised. 
Methods used to address this problem include computing heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors (robust standard errors more generally) or computing standard errors using a bootstrap 
resampling technique. Log-transforming the dependent variable gets around the problem in some 
cases but is not a guaranteed fix. WLS regression is sometimes used to control for 
heteroskedasticity, but the weights must be chosen carefully and with heteroskedasticity 
specifically in mind.25 
Serial correlation of error terms. Most primary studies use panel datasets, which are 
comprised of data collected from each state (or several companies within a state) over a number 
                                                 
24 The basic linear regression model also assumes that the relationship between the dependent variable and every 
continuous independent variable is linear. Since most independent variables employed in the original studies are 
binary, this assumption is not one that requires much attention. It should be noted, however, that no study mentions 
verifying linearity when continuous variables (e.g., income, insurance market size) are employed as controls. If the 
model does not properly capture the relationship between premiums and the controls, the estimate of the impacts of 
caps on premiums might be biased. 
25 Only Barker (1992) uses weighted least squares regression specifically to address heteroskedasticity. She relies, 
however, on the untested assumption that the variance of the error decreases proportionally as the number of risk 
exposures increases. 
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of years. This type of data often violates the assumption of uncorrelated error terms. While serial 
correlation does not lead to biased estimates, it can lead to faulty conclusions about statistical 
significance. Tests have been designed to detect the problem, and, if the problem presents, 
standard errors must be corrected (e.g., Bertrand, et al. (2004)) or a model other than the standard 
OLS should be used (e.g., auto-regressive model, moving average model, feasible generalized 
least squares) (King and Roberts, 2012). As with every model, the alternative models will 
produce valid results only if the model’s assumptions are satisfied. In addition, if the problem 
does not exist and a correction is adopted, the results could be invalid. 
A second common method for addressing possible serial correlation is by clustering 
standard errors by group. Dependence among observations often arises in data with a group 
structure. For example, premiums set by the same company in the same state might be influenced 
by similar factors over time, so that relative high premiums in one year might imply relatively 
high premiums in other years. This might not be a perfect solution, however, if the number of 
clusters is relatively small or the number of years covered by the dataset is small. Typically if 
standard errors are clustered by state and all 50 states are included in the dataset, results are 
likely to be valid. (Angrist and Pischke (2009), p. 323) 
Simultaneity. The basic linear regression model also assumes that independent variables 
are exogenous, which, in the present context, requires that changes in premiums over time do not 
influence the likelihood that caps are implemented. The probability that caps are implemented, 
however, likely depends on trends in premiums; changes in premiums and the likelihood of cap 
implementation theoretically impact one another simultaneously. If the simultaneity assumption 
is not satisfied, the researcher can address it by using a number of possible methods including an 
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instrumental variables approach, propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) and 
randomization inference (Donohue and Ho, 2007; Imbens and Rosenbaum, 2005).  
4. Additional sources of measurement error 
Obtaining correct estimates of the impacts of caps on premiums requires a fine-tuned 
coding method. Zuckerman (1990) notes that better estimates are produced when tort reforms are 
coded using effective dates rather than enacted dates, as these dates can differ in some cases. He 
also points out the importance of coding tort reforms in a way that accounts for legislative 
repeals and court decisions to strike down reforms as unconstitutional. Similarly, Grace and 
Leverty (2011) hypothesized that the presence or absence of caps is insufficient to predict insurer 
behavior—one must also consider the likelihood of judicial nullification. They consider 
temporary reforms separately from permanent reforms. 
In addition, researchers sometimes account for the possibility of insurers’ delayed 
response to legal reforms due, for example, to uncertainty around possible effects of the change 
(Danzon, 2004; Zuckerman et al., 1990).26 Several authors suggest that no-effect results might be 
caused by lack of attention to the possibility that reforms often take several years to have an 
impact given the long-tailed nature of the legal claims.27 Including lags of tort reform variables 
in the regression model28 is a common method of accounting for a possible delayed response. 
Others have suggested the opposite reaction—that insurers actually anticipate changes 
to tort law and adjust prices prior to the change. If actors anticipate changes to tort law in some 
future year, premiums in the current year might reflect these predictions (Malani and Reif, 2011). 
                                                 
26 As Born and Viscusi (1998) hypothesize, insurer losses will first reflect the impact of tort reforms, but premium 
changes might lag for several reasons including the need to obtain regulatory approval for rate changes. 
27 For example, Thorpe (2004) cites unpublished data from one large insurer revealing that nearly 12% of claims 
took at least eight years to resolve.  
28 Rather than, or in addition to, including an independent variable for tort law in effect in the year premiums are 
measured, an independent variable for tort law in place in the previous year(s) is included to capture the impacts of 
reforms passed in previous years. 
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Grace and Leverty (2011) theorize that while anticipation of the implementation of a damages 
cap will not impact prices prior to implementation, insurers might adjust insurance prices in 
anticipation of judicial strike downs of caps. The same might be posited for legislative changes 
to previously implemented caps. Grace and Leverty account for this possibility by separately 
estimating the impacts of permanent caps—those that are not deemed unconstitutional by the 
court—and temporary caps—those eventually overturned by the court. Others suggest 
incorporating “leads” of tort reform variables,29 although knowing whether the evidence supports 
anticipation or simultaneity is difficult. 
Researchers have also recognized the importance of properly weighting observations to 
obtain accurate average effect sizes that reflect, for example, market share (e.g., when insurer-
level premiums data is used to construct the dependent variable) and market size (e.g., when 
state-level premiums data are used). Weighting ensures that, when computing estimates of the 
average impacts of caps on premiums, more weight is placed, for example, on firms with larger 
market shares or on states with larger insurance markets. While failing to properly weight 
observations does not impact the statistical significance or sign of the result, it produces a biased 
estimate of the average impacts of caps. 
Finally, OLS estimates are known to be sensitive to outliers, sometimes called influential 
observations. An observation is influential if the estimate changes by a practically large amount 
when the observation is dropped from the dataset. All else constant, the likelihood of the 
presence of outliers in the dataset is reduced as the sample size increases. Log-transforming the 
dependent variable can make the estimate less sensitive to outliers, but influential outliers might 
                                                 
29 Rather than, or in addition to, including an independent variable for tort law in effect in the year premiums are 
measured, an independent variable for tort law in place in the future year(s) is included. 
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remain. Similarly, estimates produced using QR models are less sensitive to outliers, but these 
models do not guarantee a remedy.  
5. Controlling omitted variable bias 
In a perfect world, we would estimate the impact of caps on premiums by randomly 
assigning states to treatment (caps) and control (no caps) groups and measuring the difference, 
post-treatment, between average premiums across the two groups. The function of randomized 
assignment is to generate two groups of states with roughly the same distributions of 
characteristics so differences in premiums after caps are imposed can be attributed to the caps 
and not to differences in other covariates that might be correlated with the imposition of caps. 
Controlling for these covariates reduces the possibility that a portion of the impact the model 
attributes to caps should actually be attributed to other characteristics of the treatment states.  
Given that caps were not randomly assigned to states, researchers use methods to control 
both observable and unobservable covariates. Several features of insurance markets and the 
liability system other than caps impact premiums. If one or more of these features is correlated 
with the implementation of caps and is left out of the analysis, the estimated impact of cap on 
premiums will be inaccurate. Methodologically sound studies employ a number of controls to 
separate the effects of variables other than damages caps on premiums to reduce omitted variable 
bias. 
A great deal of variation across the 16 empirical studies arises from different choices over 
control variables. All studies control for other tort reforms (e.g., collateral source rules, 
modifications to joint and several liability, patient compensation funds, periodic payment 
reforms, time limits on claims including statutes of limitations and repose, implementation 
of pretrial screening panels, arbitration rules, ad damnum reforms, expert witness reforms, 
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and prohibition against punitive damages insurance), but they include different sets of 
reforms.30 These controls are especially important as reforms tend to be passed as packages, 
which increases the likelihood of correlation between caps and other types of reforms and, in 
turn, the likelihood of omitted variable bias absent controls. 
Researchers often mitigate omitted variable bias by including controls for features other 
than tort reforms that are either known or suspected to impact premiums and that might be 
correlated with the passage of damages caps. These include controls for potential claimant 
demographics (e.g., urbanization level, income per capita, citizen ideology), exposure to 
health care services (e.g., number of surgeries per capita, number of physicians per capita), 
insurance market characteristics (e.g., market concentration, insurer organizational form, 
size of insurance market, intensity of insurance price regulations, whether the state runs a 
joint underwriting association, rates of return on investments), and attorney market 
characteristics (e.g., restrictions on legal fees, number of attorneys per capita). The 
magnitude of impacts on results depends on the strength of correlations between damages caps 
and each control variable. 
Some researchers employ techniques to mitigate omitted variable bias caused by 
unobservable variables. For example, Guis (1998) argues that results from previous studies are 
biased because they do not control for unobservable differences across states and years. Cross 
sectional fixed effects are used to control variables that are constant across time but vary across 
units (states or insurers). Time fixed effects control for variables that are constant across units 
but vary over time. Some include a linear time trend to isolate general trends in premiums over 
                                                 
30 In some cases, researchers (e.g., Viscusi (1993)) coded binary variables to track whether states enacted any of a 
number of different tort reforms (e.g., any number of pro-defendant reforms, any reforms in place prior to 
premiums period, any reforms in place other than caps). This method produces more noise than methods that 
include separate controls for covariates. 
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time that might confound estimates of the impact of caps on premiums. In some cases, 
researchers include a lagged dependent variable for the same reason, although this technique is 
problematic when a panel dataset is used. (Hsiao, 2003)  
Finally, a common technique used to estimate the impacts of policy changes is 
difference-in-differences (DID) models. The method is considered “quasi-experimental”—
jurisdictions that implement the policy comprise the treatment group and non-implementers act 
as the control group. The function of the control group is to difference out any impact on the 
dependent variable caused by contemporaneous changes that occurred in all jurisdictions at the 
time of the policy change. The standard DID model incorporates cross sectional (e.g., state) fixed 
effects and year fixed effects along with a set of observed covariates as additional controls. 
Importantly, validity of DID model estimates depends heavily on two assumptions that 
often are overlooked. First, the model assumes that the policy was randomly assigned across 
state-years. This assumption is violated if features of the environment not accounted for in the 
model impact the likelihood that a state implements the policy31 or if the policy is likely to 
remain in effective in an adopting state after the first year of implementation (Bertrand et al., 
2004).32 Second, the model assumes that policy implementation does not impact the covariates. 
If, for example, caps impact the number of physicians per capita, thereby increasing physician 
supply and decreasing the population by affecting mortality, the estimates of the impacts of caps 
on premiums will suffer from post-treatment bias (Ho, 2005).33 
                                                 
31  E.g., if premiums naturally cycle over time and caps are adopted only when premiums reach a certain threshold, 
then changes in premiums might be attributed to caps when they are actually a function of the underwriting cycle. 
(Donohue and Ho, 2007). 
32 DID models assume that the likelihood of a reform being in place in one state-year is independent of whether the 
reform is in place in any other state-year. In contrast, a reform that is in place in one state-year is likely to be in 
place the following year in that state. 
33 Including and excluding possibly tainted covariates to assess sensitivity might not help (Rosenbaum, 1984). 
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With these guidelines in mind, we now assess the validity of the estimates reported in the 
literature. 
C. Validity Assessment 
Tables 5-7 summarize the methods employed to produce each estimate reported in the 
literature.34 Tables 5a-c include all results from analyses that group together various types of 
damages caps (e.g., caps on non-economic damages, punitive damages, total damages, etc.). 
Table 5a includes estimates of the impact on premiums paid per doctor. Table 5b includes 
estimates on aggregate premiums, and Table 5c on loss ratios. Each row in the table represents a 
single estimate from a single study. We report the estimate’s p-value35 from a one-tailed test of 
significance with an alternative hypothesis that the coefficient is less than zero (i.e., caps reduce 
premium growth), the sample size, degrees of freedom, and the methods used to produce the 
result. Tables 6a-c and 7 are similarly constructed but include estimates of the impact of non-
economic damages caps and punitive caps, respectively. Although many lessons can be drawn 
from analyzing the results at the coefficient level through the lens of methodological soundness, 
we focus on four general take-aways. 
1. Premiums data severely limits generalizability of results 
                                                 
34 We employed a multi-step process to compile information about the primary studies. Research assistants trained 
by us completed the initial coding. We reviewed their coding, making corrections as necessary. We also added 
variables that were not identified during the initial coding process. A research assistant then checked every element 
of the revised dataset against the primary studies, noting any inconsistencies. We reviewed flagged items and made 
the necessary corrections. Appendix 4 contains a list of relevant variables. 
35 The p-value allows us to draw inferences about the strength of the evidence for or against the tested hypothesis. 
We consider p-values from one-tailed tests, which reveal the likelihood of observing a result as extreme as the 
observed result assuming caps do not decrease premiums. The lower the p-value, the more confidence we have in 
concluding that caps reduce premium growth. The general convention is to use a 0.05 cutoff. A thick line separates 
results using this convention. 
  Where the primary study did not report p-values, we computed them using coefficients and standard errors. In the 
few cases in which only significance levels were reported, we used the average of all possible p-values assuming a 
uniform distribution (0.55 was used for results insignificant at the 10% level (0.1 + (1-0.1)/2), 0.075 for results 
significant at the 10% level (0.05 + (.1-0.05)/2), etc.). For three of the 197 results (Thorpe, 2004), we could not 
estimate p-values due to insufficient information. 
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The nature of the premiums data researchers employed gives rise to important and yet 
underappreciated limitations. None of the datasets employed in any of the primary studies allows 
generalized claims about the impacts of caps. Resulting complications depend on the data 
employed.  
Changes in aggregate annual premiums over time might be due to changes in prices, 
and/or changes in the number of polices sold, and/or changes in the types of polices sold (e.g., 
policies with varying coverage limits and deductibles). Thus, in studies that use aggregate annual 
premiums written or earned by state or by company, separating changes in price from changes in 
quantity sold from changes in the mix of policy types sold is impossible.36 Aggregate premium 
measures tend to be better proxies for gross revenue and business growth.
                                                 
36 “Total premiums reflect not only the price of insurance but also the quantity of policies sold. We cannot tell if an 
increase in total premiums means that doctors are paying more for their insurance, or if the insurer is just selling 
more policies.” Mello, 2006, p. 23. 
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Table 5a 
Any cap; Premiums paid by doctor 
 
 
KEY: OLS = ordinary least squares; wls = weighted least squares regression; quant: 10 = most profitable or largest firms, 90 = least profitable or largest firms; C = company-
level observations; S-Y = state-year observations; S = state-level observations; HCFA = Health Care Financing Administration; NAIC = National Assoc. of Insurance 
Commissioners; MLM = Medical Liability Monitor; GP = general practitioner; class 3 = St. Paul Company Class 3 physician (family physician, minor surgery, no obstetrics); 
mix = internists, general surgeons and OBGYN; log = log-transformed dependent variable; rse = robust standard errors; AR= auto-regressive model; CL = clustered standard 
errors; chk = authors checked; BS = bootstrapped standard errors; Q = quantile regression; n/a = control not applicable. BLACK BOXES indicate methodologically sound 
choice. RED BOXES (OR GRAY if in black and white) indicate choice that might generate a biased estimate or other problems. WHITE BOXES indicate method/control not 
used. 
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Table 5b 
Any cap; Aggregate premiums 
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Table 5c 
Any cap; Loss ratios 
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Table 6a 
Non-economic damages cap; Premiums paid by doctor 
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Table 6b 
Noneconomic damages cap; Aggregate premiums 
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Table 6c 
Noneconomic damages cap; Loss ratios 
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Table 7 
Punitive damages cap 
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In studies that use the ratio of earned premiums to incurred losses as a proxy for 
premiums, disaggregating quantity sold from price is possible but controlling for the change in 
policy types sold is not. Given that tort reform likely impacts physician choices over coverage 
levels,37 if regression results suggest that tort reform reduces the price per indemnified dollar, we 
are unable to discern whether amounts physicians paid for insurance decreased or whether the 
distribution of policy types purchased changed. In short, changes in premium-to-loss ratios imply 
nothing about changes in the absolute amount providers pay for insurance. Ratios are a better 
measure of profitability.  
Finally, some researchers employ data on actual prices paid by physicians in exchange 
for coverage of a particular type (e.g., policies with limits of $100,000 per occurrence and 
$300,000 annually for general practitioners). Using this type of data allows us to separate 
quantity and price and to draw inferences about amounts physicians pay for insurance, but it does 
not allow for general conclusions about prices. For example, Zuckerman et al. (1990) employ 
data only on policies with $100,000/$300,000 limits for three different specialties—general 
practice, general surgery and obstetrics/gynecology. They report finding that “imposing a cap on 
physician liability—which in many cases is a limit on plaintiff recovery—lower premiums 
substantially” (Zuckerman et al., 1990, p. 180). Given the nature of the data, however, the 
authors (and all authors who use data on prices paid for particular types of policies) can claim 
only that caps are associated with lower premiums related to policies with those particular 
coverage levels.38 
                                                 
37 For example, a physician who believes that tort reform reduces liability exposure might be willing to switch from 
a policy that covers $1M per occurrence to one that covers only $500,000 per occurrence. 
38 Importantly, the authors over-generalize in a second way. The regression results suggest that caps on physician 
liability that allow for patients to collect amounts over the cap from patient compensation funds reduced premiums 
for $100,000/$300,000 policies for three specialties in the range of 13.6% to 16.9% but also that premiums were not 
impacted by caps on non-economic damages. This distinction is not mentioned in the conclusion section. General 
conclusions in discussion sections and abstracts often need to be taken with a grain of salt. 
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This would not be a problem if all policy types were impacted similarly by caps, but they 
likely are not. For example, prices for policies with relatively high limits are more likely to be 
impacted by caps because caps are more likely to bind amounts indemnified for claims brought 
against high-limit policies. Furthermore, if caps impact physician choices over policy types, 
changes in average risk levels and changes in demand across the mix of policy types will impact 
prices separate from the direct impacts of caps. Unless prices for a broader set of policy types are 
analyzed or these sorts of factors are controlled, generalizing from reported estimates is 
impossible. Moreover, without knowing more about the percentage of physicians who purchase 
the types of policies studied, getting a sense of the impact of caps on the market as a whole is 
impossible.39 
In addition, the Medical Liability Monitor dataset, the most common dataset used to 
estimate the impacts of caps on premiums paid for individual policies, comes with severe 
limitations (Mello, 2006). First, the majority of price information in the dataset relates to policies 
with $1M/$3M coverage for limited number of physician specialties. While we have very little 
information about the distribution of policies purchased by physicians, recently reported 
evidence suggests that a large segment of the physician population might purchase policies with 
less coverage (Zeiler et al., 2007). Second, the MLM collects the data by surveying insurers who 
voluntarily participate. Insurers who are less stable or have higher prices might be less likely to 
report to the MLM for fear of sending negative signals to consumers. Thus, the survey might 
generate an unrepresentative sample. Third, while the MLM reports premiums by county for 
some large states, most reports are average premiums of major insurers across counties. Given 
that premiums vary considerably by county, at least in some states, reporting averages might 
introduce substantial noise into the estimates. 
                                                 
39 Mello (2006) notes similar shortcomings. 
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In sum, given the nature of the premiums data employed, every original study comes with 
severe limitations. No study is able to provide general estimates of the impact of caps on 
insurance prices. 
2. Possible Model Assumption Violations Not Reliably Addressed 
One of the most glaring problems with this literature is the failure to reliably address 
potential model assumption violations. The red boxes in the figures flag the estimates with 
specific problems. The Tables reveal that none of the 197 estimates was generated using methods 
that account for all the relevant basic assumptions. For example, none of the models employ 
controls for potential simultaneity even though it is theoretically plausible (and highly likely) 
that at least some state legislators implemented caps in response to premium trends. In addition, 
very few studies report even testing for assumption violations and fewer employ solid techniques 
to address observed or assumed violations (e.g., non-normal errors, heteroskedastic error terms 
and serial correlation). When violations are assumed but do not exist, employing techniques to 
address these non-existent violations can lead to unreliable estimates. In some cases techniques 
to address violations are employed but no evidence is provided to demonstrate that the violation 
was remedied (e.g., in some cases log-transforming the dependent variable will result in 
normally distributed errors, but it might not—the distribution must be examined).  
3. Measurement Issues Abound 
The Tables also reveal that measurement issues are prevalent. First, many studies do not 
account for effective dates, legislative repeals and judicial overturns. Many do not account for 
the possibility of insurers’ delayed response to caps, and none accounts for possible anticipation 
effects. Almost all estimates are derived from models that do not properly weight observations to 
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account for market share and market size differentials, etc.40 In many cases the potential for bias 
caused by outliers is either ignored or not adequately accounted for. Measurement errors can lead 
both to inaccurate estimates and incorrect conclusions regarding whether caps have a statistically 
significant impact on premiums.  
4. Lack of Controls for Alternative Explanations 
The Tables also signal vast potential for biased estimates due to the lack of control for 
alternative explanations. Given that reforms are regularly passed in packages, omitting controls 
for other tort reforms that put downward pressure on premiums will lead to false positives when 
it comes to assessing whether caps reduce premium growth. None of the studies that find a 
statistically significant negative impact on premiums controls for all (or indeed most) variables 
theorized to be both correlated with caps and drivers of premium variation. While some studies 
employ fixed effects, these control only for variables that vary over time and are fixed across 
cross sections (e.g., companies and states) and for variables that vary across cross sections and 
are constant across time. In some cases, fixed effects are not employed, which invites bias if 
fixed differences across states or fixed differences across time impact premiums.41  
While several of the original studies employ a difference-in-differences model that 
controls for both time fixed effects and group fixed effects, none perform an analysis to 
determine whether states that did not implement caps during or prior to the study period make 
good control groups (Donohue and Ho, 2007). In addition, none check for pre-treatment trends, 
which would necessitate the use of a different empirical model. 
                                                 
40 “Computing a simple average, rather than a weighted average, treats the companies as though they have identical 
shares of the market. Adjusting for market share and also for the number of physicians insured in each region of the 
state can make a big difference in the estimate of statewide average premiums: for Kentucky in 2002, for example, 
the simple average premium for obstetrician-gynecologists was $58,287 but the weighted average premium was 19 
percent less ($48,897).” Mello (2006) 
41 The political leaning of states is an example of a possible state fixed effect. Time fixed effects include federal 
interventions such as National Practitioner Databank reporting requirements, which some believe lead hospitals to 
encourage patients to drop physicians from claims so physicians can avoid reporting to the Databank 
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4. Conclusion 
 
Tables 5-7 clearly demonstrate wide variation in methods employed to estimate the 
impacts of caps on premium growth. Variation in results likely is due, at least in part, to variation 
in data and method employed. While a more systematic technique referred to as meta-analysis 
exists for separating the effects of modeling techniques on results, we were not able to employ it 
here due to the small number of estimates relative to the number of methods we identified for our 
analysis. Thus, we are unable to make empirical claims about systematic impacts of different 
methods on estimates. The Tables, however, make a clear case for the use of an abundance of 
caution when deciding whether to put any amount of weight on any one study. 
 We detected no differences in methodological quality between results that support the 
caps-reduce-premiums claim and those that do not. One question we might ask is: which 
estimate is most reliable from a methods perspective? More generally, we might wish to get a 
sense of how much weight can be assigned to each estimate given the methods employed. 
Unfortunately, this question cannot be answered using the information we report. Even if some 
of the estimates were produced using nearly perfect methods, just one model violation or omitted 
variable might lead to more severe problems than those produced by models with several 
deficiencies. 
In closing, we turn to the big picture. Most agree that our primary goals are to increase 
access to health care, improve its quality and to lower its cost (or to at least achieve efficient use 
of resources allocated to health care markets). These goals might suggest that we need to turn our 
attention to the impacts of damages caps on other important outcomes, including physician 
supply, defensive medicine, health care costs and health care insurance premiums. While these 
outcomes are important and studying them is necessary for a comprehensive view of the impact 
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of caps, proponents of caps continue to make claims about their impact on medical malpractice 
insurance premiums, and these claims continue to impact legislative outcomes and court 
decisions on the constitutionality of caps. It remains important, therefore, to get a solid handle on 
general inferences we can draw from the empirical literature that focuses on this albeit narrow 
question. Our analysis reveals not only that the results are mixed, despite claims to the contrary, 
but also that more methodologically sound research that employs more comprehensive data is 
essential.  
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Appendix 1: Scope of literature reviews 
 
Review Time period covered42 Method for inclusion 
Independent 
variables 
addressed 
Dependent variables 
addressed 
Number of 
studies 
included43 
OTA 
1993 1990-1992 
Studies employing systematic 
empirical methods, excluded 
single-state studies, studies pre-
dating 1980, descriptive studies and 
literature reviews 
Various tort 
reforms 
Premiums, severity, 
frequency 3 
CBO 
2004 1993-2004 No explicit method 
Various tort 
reforms 
Premiums, brief mention 
of frequency and 
severity, defensive 
medicine 
3 
Kessler 
2006 1990-1992 No explicit method 
Various tort 
reforms (and 
other reforms) 
Brief mention of 
premiums, claim 
severity, defensive 
medicine, various other 
aspects of the 
malpractice system 
2 
Kane 
2005, 
2007 
1985-2006 
Papers that employ statistical 
techniques to account for 
competing explanations 
Focused on caps, 
brief mention of 
other reforms 
Premiums, brief mention 
of frequency and 
severity, physician 
supply, defensive 
medicine 
5 
Nelson 
2007 1990-2006 
Better studies (control for 
differences across states and time 
and nonrandom enactment of the 
law). Strongest studies use fixed-
effects. 
Damages caps 
Premiums, defensive 
medicine, physician 
supply 
9 
Mello 
2004-
2010 
1985-2006 Specifically identified criteria for rigor, but included weak studies 
Various tort 
reforms (and 
other reforms) 
Premiums, frequency, 
severity, physician 
supply, defensive 
medicine, quality of 
care, defense costs 
8 
RAND 
2011 1985-2006 Used Mello’s selected studies 
Various tort 
reforms 
Premiums, frequency, 
severity, health 
expenditures 
7 
 
                                                 
42 The time period covered includes only studies addressing the effect of damage caps on premiums. The time period 
reflects the range of publication dates covered by the primary studies included in the review. 
 
43 This number includes only studies addressing observed (as opposed to simulated) effects of medical malpractice 
damages caps on premiums. We did not count studies that group caps with other types of tort reforms even when the 
review author included these types of studies in the analysis. We also did not include primary studies that did not 
produce regression results. 
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Appendix 2: Studies of the impact of caps on premiums included in each literature review 
 
 Sloan 1985 
Zucker-
man 
1990 
Black-
mon 
1991 
Barker 
1992 
Viscusi 
1993 
Viscusi 
1995 
Born 
1998 
Gius 
1998 
Danzon 
2004 
Thorpe 
2004 
Viscusi 
2005 
Kil-
gore 
2006 
OTA 
1993  X X X         
CBO 
2004     X  X   X   
Kes-
sler 
2006 
 X  X         
Nelson 
2007  X X
44  X X  X X X X X 
Kane 
2005, 
2007 
X X        X X X 
Mello 
2004-
2010 
X X X  X    X X X X 
RAND 
2011 X X X  X    X X X  
 
 
Appendix 3: Search strategy 
 
Our goal was to locate all relevant reported and unreported regression results included in 
studies of whether damages caps (of any sort) impact premiums. Table A3 summarizes the 
specific search strategies by database. When these search terms generated roughly 250 or fewer 
results, we evaluated each for relevance. We used full text search where available (and where it 
did not generate too many results) or, alternatively, we searched using keywords or subject 
headings. For several databases, we were able to use a very general search term “damage cap” 
OR “damages cap” OR “tort reform” without generating an unduly number of results. For two 
additional databases, the general phrase “tort reform” generated too many results, so we 
narrowed the search to: “damage cap” OR “damages cap” OR (“tort reform” AND (empirical 
OR regression)). 
For several additional databases, the term “tort reform” (even when paired with these 
additional search terms) generated large numbers of results, as did “damage cap” OR “damages 
                                                 
44 Nelson cites to a 1990 report, which was a less detailed study than the 1991 results reported in Blackmon’s book. 
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cap” without additional search terms. The search term (“damage cap” OR “damages cap”) AND 
(empirical OR regression) was used for several databases. For several additional databases, the 
term “empirical” generated too many results when paired with “damage cap” OR “damages cap,” 
we used the search term ((“damage cap” OR “damages cap”) AND regression).  
Table A3: Search terms by database 
Search terms Databases 
“damage cap” OR “damages cap” OR “tort 
reform” 
SSRN, Econlit, Catalogue of US Government 
Publications, ProQuest Congressional 
“damage cap” OR “damages cap” OR (“tort 
reform” AND (empirical OR regression)) PubMed, Index to Legal Periodicals 
(“damage cap” OR “damages cap”) AND 
(empirical OR regression) 
ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, JSTOR, Academic 
Search Primer, ABI Inform Complete, BePress 
(“damage cap” OR “damages cap”) AND 
regression 
Hein Online, Westlaw (law review database), Google 
Books and Google Scholar* 
(“damage cap” OR “damages cap”) AND 
regression AND “medical malpractice”) Google 
 
* Additional searches performed in Google Scholar were performed using the following terms: 
noneconomic damages caps medical malpractice insurance regression, tort reform regression 
damage caps medical malpractice, claim severity tort reform regression, claim frequency tort 
reform regression, health insurance premiums tort reform regression, tort reform regression, 
liability insurance regression medical malpractice. 
 
Finally, we used the most specific search term ((“damage cap” OR “damages cap”) AND 
regression AND “medical malpractice”) in Google. This generated nearly 700 results, and we 
reviewed the first 250. We also performed a number of Google Scholar searches using the 
following search terms individually: damages caps, medical malpractice insurance regression, 
tort reform regression damage caps medical malpractice, claim severity tort reform regression, 
claim frequency tort reform regression, health insurance premiums tort reform regression, tort 
reform regression, liability insurance regression medical malpractice. 
An additional search was performed using the following databases: NBER, Wiley Online 
Library, Science Direct, Lexis Nexis, Proquest, Health Affairs, and the Georgetown Law 
Library’s E-Journal Finder). Search terms employed included: damage caps, medical malpractice 
damage caps, empirical AND tort AND malpractice, insurance AND tort liability, empirical 
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AND tort reform, medical malpractice, medical malpractice AND tort reform, damage caps 
AND malpractice AND reform, caps AND damages, and summary((damage /3 cap) OR tort 
reform /100 economic! and empirical). To supplement this search, we reviewed the 
bibliographies of the primary studies and the literature reviews.  
